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Abstract
Universities were rst established in Europe around the twelfth century, while primary
schools did not appear until the nineteenth. This paper accounts for this phenomenon us-
ing a political economy model of educational change on who are educated (the elite or the
masses) and what is taught (general or specic/vocational education). A key assumption is that
general education is more e¤ective than specic education in enhancing ones skills in a broad
range of tasks, including political rent-seeking. Its ndings suggest that specic education for
the masses is compatible with the elite rule, while mass general education is not, which renes
the conventional association between education and democracy.
JEL: O10, O40, P16, N10.
Key Words: General Education, Specic Education, Elite Education, Mass Education, Long-
Run Development.
1 Introduction
Modern school systems are usually operated on a well-structured, hierarchical ladder of grade
levels starting from primary school, then moving to secondary school, and nally completed at the
I thank the editor, Vincenzo Quadrini, and an anonymous referee as well as participants at WEAI 2009 Kyoto
conference for very helpful comments.
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university of higher learning. This sequence has become so natural to us in modern times that it
may be surprising to be reminded that this was not the case in most parts of human history. In fact,
as a formal structure, the university or highest level of education was invented before secondary
schools, and in a sense, even before elementary schools.(Collins 2000, P. 213). Universities were
rst established in Europe around the twelfth century, while primary schools did not appear until
the nineteenth. Universities provided general education for a very small elite who would become
the future leaders for State and Church, while primary schools as well as vocational secondary
schools were initially created for the poor masses to teach them basic reading, writing, arithmetic
and some specic vocational skills. There is some consensus that the modern education system for
the masses arose around 1870 in western Europe and the U.S., while mass general education at
the university level started after the second World War and is still an ongoing process (Trow 1967,
Mueller, Ringer and Simon 1977, Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal 1992, Goldin 1999, Bowen 2003).
So during a long time in history, only a few ruling elite were educated and the elite education
focused on general education, while mass schooling occurred much later, around the time of indus-
trialization, and it started from specic or vocational education and gradually moved to general
education. This seems to be a general trend of educational change at least in the history of western
Europe. This paper uses a political economy model to account for such a historical trend in terms
of who are educated (the elite or the masses) and what is taught (general or specic education). A
main theoretical puzzle is why, on the one hand, specic education preceded general education for
the masses, while on the other hand, the elite were trained exclusively in general education.1
The intuition begins with the conventional di¤erences between general and specic education
or human capital (Becker 1964, Bennett 1967).2 General education increases ones general ability
in learning new knowledge and technologies, but it is more costly to acquire in terms of intellectual
e¤ort because it needs to build on a broad and abstract knowledge base. Skill-specic education, in
contrast, teaches task-specic skills and is thus less costly to acquire, but it is narrow in knowledge
1This paper focuses on the evolution of organized education conducted in schools, while treating unorganized
learning in daily life as the default starting point. See Section 6 for more discussions on this.
2The theoretical distinction between general and specic human capital has become widely adopted in economics;
see, for example, Gould, Moav and Weinberg (2001), Lazear (2003), Bertocchi and Spagat (2004), Krueger and Kumar
(2004a, b), Wasmer (2006), Iyigun and Owen (1999, 2006).
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coverage and not deep enough to facilitate further learning and easy adaptation to new things.3 An
implication of the di¤erences in these two kinds of education is that, when technological changes are
slow, it is more benecial to get specic skills than general education since there is less need to adapt
to new technologies. This partially explains why specic education preceded general education for
the masses.
Another important di¤erence between general and specic education is from the political aspect.
General education increases ones general productivity in solving problems, which implies that it
also increases ones skills of extracting gains and defending ones interests when there are political
conicts. Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, observed that A man who has never gone to school
may steal from a freight car, but if he has a university education he may steal the whole railroad.
And in general there is evidence that better educated people are better organized and more active
politically (Meyer and Rubinson 1975, Collins 1971). Specic skills, in contrast, increase ones task-
specic productivity but not necessarily their political rent-seeking skills or organizing e¢ ciency.
So when the potential rent is large enough, the elite will focus only on general education even when
the knowledge stock changes slowly, thus not following the natural precedence of specic education
that arises from pure economical concerns.
The implication for mass education, however, is the opposite. On the one hand, the elite benet
from a better educated and hence more productive workforce through larger tax revenues, the more
so when the capital-labor ratio is larger. But on the other hand, the elites political privileges may
be reduced or threatened when the masses acquire more general education, which makes them
better equipped in defense of their own interests. This is consistent with Alexis de Tocquevilles
famous proposition To enlighten the people is to destroy kings.4 So the ruling elite may nd it
3 In reality, an education program may contain a mixture of both specic and general education, which makes it
less straightforward to classify it into either category. It is still possible, however, to ascertain the main component
and purpose of an education program and categorize it accordingly. The primary school under the elite rule, for
instance, by teaching pupils preliminary reading and number skills in preparation for later vocational training and
by indoctrinating blind obedience, can be categorized as specic education. In contrast, the primary school that
prepares pupils for future academic endeavors has to cultivate independent thinking besides teaching the basic skills,
and so it belongs to an organic part of general education.
4The landed elite in England, for example, opposed mass schooling because they believed that giving education
to the labouring classes of the poor ... would render them factious and refractory, ... would render them insolent to
their superiors (quoted in Lindert 2004, pp. 100). And such attitudes could be found on the part of propertied
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benecial to support mass specic education, but not mass general education, especially when the
potential loss of political rent is large relative to the productivity gain. It suggests that under the
elite rule mass general education is more likely to be repressed and delayed than specic education.
These results are applicable not only to the distinction between general and specic education,
but also to di¤erent subjects in general education such as humanities versus natural sciences; if
humanities are more likely to increase ones political rent-seeking skills than natural sciences, then
an implication is that the ruling elite will invest earlier and more in humanities than in natural
sciences, the more so when the political rent is larger. In stark contrast, the political elite would
be more willing to teach the masses natural sciences than humanities.5 These results bring new
insights to our understanding of educational change over time and across countries.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it proposes a simple political
economy model to account for the major educational change in history, especially in terms of who
are educated and what is taught. This is an important issue itself that warrants serious research
e¤ort, given the crucial role of knowledge and human capital in promoting economic growth and
general welfare. Second, this model can be readily extended to address important questions such
as why in history the progress of natural sciences lagged behind humanities, and the more so in
societies with larger political rents or with an open-elite system such as that in pre-modern China.
Third, this paper generates new insights in the relationship between education, political regimes and
economic growth. For example, it shows that specic education for the masses can be supported by
the elite rule or other forms of non-democratic political systems, since it is not necessarily conducive
to democratization.
This new insight on compatibility between mass specic education with the elite rule renes
the conventional association between education and democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2005). It suggests
that the average schooling level may not be a su¢ cient statistic for education, and what children are
taught in terms of general versus specic education is of great importance. Specically, it may shed
conservatives in practically any country and century(Lindert 2004, pp. 101).
5For similar reasons, the elite would be willing to teach the masses social, moral and civic values that help solidify
their rule, which is one of the reasons for the public support of mass education (see, for example, Bowles and Gintis
1976, Lott 1990, Gradstein and Justman 2002). This is also consistent with the state building rationale of mass
schooling (Green 1990, Lindert 2004).
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light on the puzzling fact that Prussia (and then Germany) was the rst to start mass education but
a stable democracy was established much later than others (Lindert 2004); a possible explanation is
that mass education in Germany was predominantly vocational with a heavy dose of obedient and
patriotic conditioning (Green 1990), which could work well for the elite or authoritarian rule. In
contrast, another leader in mass education, the U.S., emphasized general education and established
democracy from early on (Goldin 1999, 2001).
This paper is related to a number of studies. The evidence for the initial increase and then
decline of vocational education in the process of economic development is shown by Bertocchi and
Spagat (2004), who propose that the elite restrict access to general education because it brings
more social status compared with vocational education. The externalities of individual education
on the distribution of human capital level and economic growth are studied by Galor and Tsiddon
(1997), while Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) show that mass education may be delayed by land
owners instead of industrialists. Brezis and Crouzet (2006) focus on the training of elites in history.
Grossman and Kim (2003) examine the choice between an egalitarian and an elitist education policy
where property of the rich may be threatened by the poor. None of these studies, however, analyzes
the evolution of the entire education system that covers historical periods both before and after
the Industrial Revolution in addition to major trends in both the elite and mass education.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briey describes the relevant historical evidence
of educational change in western Europe and the U.S. The basic model setup and the analysis of
the benchmark model are provided in the following two sections, respectively. The main results of
the paper are analyzed in Section 5, while some important extensions of the model are considered
in Section 6. The nal section concludes. All technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Historical Evidence
The main results of this paper suggest that the educational change can be categorized into three
phases: (1) Elite Education. The political elite are educated rst and in general education while
the masses do not receive any formal education for a long time. (2) Stratied Education. When
the capital-labor ratio becomes large enough, it may be benecial for the elite to support specic
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or technical education for the masses, while the elite still receive general education, and so the
education system is stratied. (3) Mass Education. After the elite rule is replaced by democracy,
which is endogenously determined by the general education level of the masses, mass education may
still be dual-track initially, where both specic education and general education are pursued. Over
time, however, mass education will eventually move towards general education. This is broadly
consistent with the western history.
Before the nineteenth century, the masses hardly received any formal education at all, while
the elites were educated in classical studies that were designed mainly to train free thinkers, rather
than preparing for any specic or narrow vocations. Over the years, and especially during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, scientic knowledge as to the forces and laws of the physical
world was gradually accumulated by scholars. Important development and great applications were
made in the nineteenth century, which kicked in the era of modern economic growth (Mokyr 2002).
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, the rise of science-based new industries such as
chemicals and electricity made the grasp of systematic scientic knowledge essential for worker
productivity, and the need to train the masses with relevant technical knowledge was strongly felt.
As a consequence, vocational education for the masses started in the leading industrial countries
around 1870. The elite education, however, was hardly changed from before and run separately
from the mass schools. So the education system was highly stratied, especially in continental
Europe. Though democracy was achieved in the leading industrial countries by the end of World
War I, the dual-track education system continued for decades, and a unied general education
system was not attempted or realized until after World War II (Collins 2000).
Elite Education. In the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, a number of schools, in time
known as universities, came into prominence. They represent a reaction to the changed conditions
of the times such as the rise of the city and the revival of trade and industry. They o¤ered studies
in four traditional faculties, namely, arts, law, medicine, and theology, and trained future leaders
for State and Church. During the Renaissance in the fteenth and sixteenth centuries, language
and literature of ancient Greece and Rome formed the main content of elite education and were
known as humanities. The typical humanistic schools of Europe were the German Gymnasium
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and the English public schools. The grammar school of the American colonies was a transplanted
English public school. This humanistic education dominated the training of the elite classes of
society for the next four hundred years. For example, the form of the English public schools was
not drastically modied until the report of the royal commissioners of investigation in 1864.
Stratied and Mass Education. As commercial and industrial sectors gradually become
dominant economic activities, the Industrial Revolution started rst in England around the middle
of the eighteenth century and later spread to other western countries. The industrialization process
brought forth fundamental changes across Europe, transforming it from a primarily agrarian society
to a mature industrial society by the end of the nineteenth century; it increased demand for skilled
workers and set the stage for the beginning of mass education in western Europe and America.
Germany. Prussia was the rst modern state to start mass education, and by 1825, it had
taken over education from the Church and made it an instrument of the State. Its education system,
however, was a highly stratied two-class school system, and it was continued after the formation of
the German Empire in 1871. Children of the laboring classes attended the basic elementary schools
(Volksschule: folk-schools), which were designed to create an intelligent but obedient and patriotic
citizenship; a vast program of vocational education was, about a half century later, developed for
the graduates of the Volksschule. For those who were to form the o¢ cial and directing class of
society, a classical training track composed of Gymnasium and university was provided. Up at least
to 1914, schools for the masses educated about 92% children, while schools for the leaders educated
8% (Cubberley 1920, pp. 578). The basic pattern of this two-class education system has not been
dramatically changed ever since.6 The establishment of a stable liberal parliamentary republic was
not achieved in West Germany until its major military defeat in the World War II and in East
Germany until the reunication of Germany in 1990.
France. The Law of 1833, which established lower and higher primary schools, marked the
rst time in French history that an earnest e¤ort was made to provide education for the great
mass of the people. The basic form of French national education was achieved under the Third
Republic (1870), which started a lasting democracy with universal male su¤rage. The French state
6Currently in Germany about 25% secondary-school-age children enter the Gymnasium, and the majority rest
attend some schools that eventually lead to vocational training (Encyclopedia Britannica).
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school system was also of two-class, where schools for the masses were composed by the primary
and vocational schools, and schools for the elite included the lycees and universities. No concerted
drive was made to reform this system until World War I. Reforms eventually took place in 1960s
when the access to secondary education was open up for all children, and since 1980s the lycees
and then higher education were becoming accessible to the great majority of young people.
England. Starting from the Elementary Education Act of 1870, England started to establish
compulsory elementary education for the masses. The curriculum of most elementary schools was
limited to reading and writing. The Balfour Act of 1902 equalized and unied educational provisions
and made the general provision of secondary education possible. New modern-type universities were
created in various cities to extend the educational ladder upward. However, even after World War
I only a small proportion of pupils, around 1920 about 10 per cent, transferred from the upper
grades of the elementary into the secondary schools, and only 1 per cent or less of these former
elementary-school pupils entered the university (Ulich 1961, pp. 117-118). It was not until the
Education Act of 1944 that the old class division of secondary schools for the privileged, on the one
hand, and elementary and vocational schools for the masses, on the other hand, was broken down.
Starting from 1960s the number of comprehensive schools has grown so that most state-maintained
secondary schools are now comprehensive.
United States. The American education was initially similar to that in Europe, focused almost
exclusively on training a small elite through the Latin grammar schools and universities. In the
middle of the eighteenth century, the elementary or common school had been established in di¤erent
states to provide the basic education to children of the masses. The full white manhood su¤rage
was largely complete by the 1840s in the U.S. After 1870, the mass secondary school started to
grow, which was largely terminal, providing an increasingly vocational education for the new body
of white-collar workers (Trow 1967). The rapid growth of higher education occurred after World
War II, and as a consequence, prompted the transformation of the terminal secondary system into
a mass preparatory system (Goldin 1999, 2001).
In summary, the three phases of educational change, namely, elite education, stratied educa-
tion, and mass education (from dual track to mass general education) are broadly consistent with
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historical evidence of western Europe and the U.S.. Similar school systems have been reproduced
in many other countries, where mass general education links closely with democracy (Cubberley
1920).
3 The Basic Model
There are overlapping generations with a xed population of measure N . Each individual lives for
two periods, accumulating human capital in childhood and participating in production at adult-
hood.
Technology and Endowment. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous
good that can be used for consumption and investment. The production function at time t+ 1 is
Yt+1 = H

t+1K
1 
t+1 ;
where Ht+1 is the aggregate stock of human capital and Kt+1 is the aggregate physical capital.
They depreciate fully after one period that is equivalent to an individuals adulthood.
The total amount of human capital Ht+1 is composed of two distinct forms, general human
capital Hg;t+1 and task-specic human capital Hs;t+1, where
Ht+1  At+1Hg;t+1 +AtHs;t+1:
This suggests that workers with general human capital can access the current knowledge stock At+1,
while those with specic human capital can only access At, the knowledge stock in the previous
period. It captures an essential di¤erence between these two kinds of human capital, where general
human capital allows one to transform new knowledge into productivity, while specic human
capital does not.7
The knowledge stock At+1 grows at an endogenously determined speed (Hg;t) such that
At+1 = At(1 + (Hg;t)); (1)
where 0 > 0 and (0) is a very small positive number. That is, the speed of knowledge accumulation
is strictly increasing in general human capital Hg;t, but constant with regard to the stock of specic
7Similar results can be obtained if some degree of complementarity between Hg;t+1 and Hs;t+1 exists, for example,
as in Ht+1 = [(At+1Hg;t+1) + (AtHs;t+1)]1= where   1.
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skills. This assumption reects the fact that general human capital is more e¤ective in generating
new knowledge than specic skills. The initial stock of knowledge A0 > 0 is exogenously given.
Preferences. Individuals are identical in preferences, which are represented by a log-linear
utility function8
uti = (1  ) log cti +  log(z + bti);
where cti is the adulthood consumption of individual i in generation t, bti is his bequest for o¤spring,
 2 (0; 1) indicates the relative weight of bequest, and z > 0 represents some threshold level of
income. The budget constraint is cti + bti  Iti, where Iti is individual is income at adulthood.
As a result of utility maximization, his optimal bequest is bti = maxf(Iti   z(1  )=); 0g. That
is, only when an individuals income is higher than a certain level indicated by Z  z(1   )=,
would there be any resources left as bequest. The bequest bti can be invested in physical capital or
human capital for the next generation. The total bequest in society is
Bt =
X
i
bti =
X
i
maxf(Iti   Z); 0g:
Investment in Physical and Human Capital. Let mkti, mgti, and msti denote respectively
the amount of material resources invested in the three capital forms, namely physical capital, general
human capital, and specic human capital. The sum of them cannot exceed the total savings so
that mkti +mgti +msti  bti must hold. The aggregate physical capital is thus
Kt+1 =
X
i
mkti:
Each worker is endowed with a basic unit of specic human capital, namely the raw labor, even
without any education expenditure; to acquire human capital above the basic level, however, a
positive amount of material is needed. The human capital production function h() is the same for
both general and specic human capital, where h() is concave with h(0) = 0 and h0(0) =  < +1.
An individual can invest in only one type of human capital, which is either
hg;t+1;i = h(mgti) or hs;t+1;i = h(msti) + 1:
8As long as a person with a higher income saves more, the exact specications of utility function are not essential
for the qualitative results.
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The aggregate general and specic human capital are thus Hg;t+1 =
P
i hg;t+1;i and Hs;t+1 =P
i hs;t+1;i, respectively.
Individuals have heterogenous innate abilities, which a¤ect their costs of investing in general
human capital. The ability distribution is identical across generations, so is the individual ability
in the same family. Specically, the ability of an individual i in any generation t is ai, which has a
distribution of F () on the interval [al; ah]  [0;+1). The investment cost of general human capital
is C(ai; hgti) > 0, where C1 < 0 and C2 < 0. That is, it is less costly in e¤ort to invest in general
education if one has a higher ability or if ones parent has higher general human capital. The cost of
investing in specic human capital is normalized to zero for all individuals. This captures another
di¤erence between general and specic human capital, that is, it is more costly to acquire general
human capital since it needs to build on a much broader and more abstract knowledge base.
4 Educational Change: The Benchmark Case
We rst consider the benchmark case where there is no political conict and individuals are endowed
with an identical amount of physical capital K0=N . It is straightforward to show that as knowledge
accumulates over time, the economy rst invests in physical capital, then in specic human capital,
and nally in general human capital, where individuals with higher abilities invest earlier.
Production. Production is operated in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the capital
return rate rt+1, the wage rate per unit of specic human capital ws;t+1 and the wage rate per unit
of general human capital wg;t+1, producers in period t + 1 choose the amount of physical capital
and two types of human capital to maximize prots. That is,
fKt+1;Hs;t+1;Hg;t+1g = argmax(At+1Hg;t+1+AtHs;t+1)K1 t+1  rt+1Kt+1 ws;t+1Hs;t+1 wg;t+1Hg;t+1:
The inverse demand functions for these production factors are
rt+1 = (1  )k t+1; (2)
ws;t+1 = Atk
1 
t+1 ; (3)
wg;t+1 = At+1k
1 
t+1 ; (4)
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where kt+1  Kt+1=Ht+1 is the ratio between the stock of physical capital and the aggregate human
capital. Not surprisingly, the wage rate of general human capital is higher than that of specic
skills, and both increase in the capital-labor ratio kt+1.
Investment in Physical and Human Capital. The initial income of individuals is assumed
to be larger than Z so that bequests are positive.9 In any period t, the bequest bt is allocated
among mkt and mst or mgt to maximize a childs adult income minus any relevant investing cost.10
So the relevant objective function is maxfIs;t+1; Ig;t+1   C(ai; hgti)g where
Is;t+1  maxmst rt+1(bt  mst) + ws;t+1h(mst) + ws;t+1;
Ig;t+1  maxmgt rt+1(bt  mgt) + wg;t+1h(mgt) + ws;t+1;
taking as given rt+1, ws;t+1, and wg;t+1. Income Is;t+1 is obtained when a child invests in specic
human capital, while Ig;t+1 applies when he invests in general human capital.
Dene  (kt+1) as the extra income of having general education than specic education:
 (kt+1)  Ig;t+1   Is;t+1: (5)
The following lemma shows that it is more benecial to pursue general education when the capital-
labor ratio kt+1 is higher.
Lemma 1  (kt+1) > 0 and  0(kt+1) > 0.
An individual i will invest in general education if and only if Ig;t+1 C(ai; hgti)  Is;t+1, which
is equivalent to  (kt+1)  C(ai; hgti). As individuals are identical except for their innate abilities,
it is straightforward to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique threshold ability at+1 in each generation t+ 1 where
 (kt+1)  C(at+1; 0) = 0 (6)
9When the initial income is smaller than Z, there is no capital investment in the initial periods. Suppose the rst
period that investment starts is t0 so that It0 = Z holds, which uniquely determines t0, since the income It strictly
increases over time due to g > 0. Then we can use period t0 as our new initial period.
10The subscript i is suppressed whenever possible to simplify the notations. Here we implicitly assume that the
child makes the allocation decision, possibly under parental guidance.
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such that individuals with higher abilities ai  at+1 invest mgt in general education, while others
invest mst in specic education. For interior solutions, mgt and mst are determined respectively by
At+1kt+1h
0(mgt) = 1  ; (7)
Atkt+1h
0(mst) = 1  : (8)
The threshold ability at+1 declines over time as kt+1 increases.
This lemma suggests that in each period t+ 1 it is optimal for individuals with lower abilities
than the threshold level at+1 to invest in specic education mst and others to invest in general
education mgt. And over time more and more people switch from specic to general education as
the threshold ability at+1 declines. Note that the optimal education investments mgt and mst, once
positive, are independent of individual abilities and thus constant across individuals.
Market Equilibrium. In the market equilibrium, the demand and supply of physical capital
as well as those of the two types of human capital are equal:
Hs;t+1 = NF (a

t+1)h(m

st) +N;
Hg;t+1 = N(1  F (at+1))h(mgt);
Kt+1 = Bt  NF (at+1)mst  N(1  F (at+1))mgt;
which determine their respective market prices in each period.
Educational Change. Let t1 denote the rst time that specic human capital starts to
accumulate. The comparative statics of at+1 imply that when the capital-labor ratio kt+1 is too
small, at+1 > ah is possible for some periods so that no one acquires general education. Let t2
denote the rst time when (6) holds for individuals with the highest ability ah, or equivalently,
 (kt2)  C(ah; 0) = 0: (9)
Then general human capital starts to accumulate from t2 onwards. The following proposition shows
that when the exogenous knowledge accumulation speed (0) is small enough we get t1 < t2, that
is, specic education precedes general education.
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Proposition 1 Before t1 all savings are invested in physical capital accumulation, where t1 is
determined by
At1 1kt1 =
1  

: (10)
When (0) is small enough, specic education starts earlier than general education. i.e., 0 < t1 < t2.
The intuition is as follows. Before t1; no one invests in human capital because investing in
physical capital yields higher returns, as there is a natural endowment of specic human capital
N even without investment. Only when the capital-labor ratio exceeds a certain threshold level,
which happens after period t1, does the investment in human capital start. During the early periods
t 2 [t1; t2], only specic human capital is invested, as the knowledge gap across periods, (0)At,
is too small to justify the investing cost of general education.11 After period t2, however, the
knowledge gap becomes large enough for the ablest individuals to acquire general education, and as
a result, knowledge starts to accumulate at ever faster speeds (Hgt) > (0) than before, gradually
making it benecial for less able individuals to invest in general education, too. Eventually, when
the knowledge stock increases fast enough, all individuals will invest in general education after a
certain period t3, where t3 is uniquely determined by
 (kt3)  C(al; 0) = 0: (11)
It is obvious that t2 < t3 must hold.
The evolution of these two types of human capital over time is illustrated in Figure 1. The
average level of specic human capital remains at the endowment level 1 before period t1, since
then it gradually increases over time as all individuals start to acquire specic education from t1;
it starts to decline some time after t2 when the ablest individuals switch from specic to general
education, and eventually returns back to its initial level 1 at period t3 when all have switched.
This inverted-U shape of specic education is observed in many countries during their economic
development process (Bertocchi and Spagat 2004). The accumulation of general human capital, in
contrast, starts later (at period t2) than specic education but its stock keeps increasing over time.
11 In the alternative case with large (0), it is possible for general education to precede specic education. Then
the political economy model can be used to explain why the opposite path occurs for mass education. See Section 6
for further discussions.
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Figure 1: Educational Change in the Basic Model: From Specic to General Education
This benchmark model demonstrates the implications on the educational change by di¤erent
technical features of general and specic education. They are consistent with the change of mass
education, but not with elite education. Indeed, to account for di¤erences between education of
the elite and the masses, a political economy model is needed. Furthermore, note that investment
in general human capital is ine¢ cient due to its positive externality on the knowledge stock and
hence on productivity. That is, compared to the social optimal result, individuals tend to invest
too late and too little in general human capital. Such ine¢ ciencies may be partially mitigated in a
political economy model where rent-seeking opportunities are available.
5 Educational Change: A Political Economy Model
In the beginning of the political economy model, individuals are of two types, the ruling elite and
the masses. Each elite member is endowed with an identical amount of physical capital K0=Ne,
where Ne denotes the measure of the elite, while the masses have no capital endowment. The elite
have the political power and thus can impose tax and other public policies on the masses.
The tax-extracting ability of an elite member is increasing and concave in his general human
capital hegt, but decreases in the average general human capital of the masses denoted by h
p
gt.
Specically, an elite individual gets a tax revenue
(hegt)(1  d(hpgt))Ipt ;
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where  0 > 0,  00 < 0, and ()  1=Ne. Ipt denotes the aggregate income of the masses; d(h
p
gt)
denotes the ability of the masses to counter-act the elites political ruling and tax extraction, where
d0 > 0 and d(0) = 0 for normalization.
Let bh denote the threshold level of workersaverage general human capital such that
1  d(bh)  0:
Note that when the masses acquire enough general human capital such that h
p
gt  bh, their abilities
to defend their own interests become so high that the tax revenue of the elite becomes zero or
negative, since 1   d(hpgt)  1   d(bh) = 0. In other words, the cost of ruling exceeds the benet
for the elite when h
p
gt  bh, and so they are better o¤ by extending political power to the masses.
That is, the political transition from the elite rule to democracy occurs when the masses become
too di¢ cult to rule.12 In this context, democracy is dened as the political system where all
individuals share the political power so that there is no expropriating tax, and public policies are
chosen through majority voting by all individuals. The other elements of the model are the same
as before.
In this political economy model, general human capital enhances an individuals political bar-
gaining ability as represented by the tax-generating skill (hegt) of the elite and the tax-evading
skill d(h
p
gt) of the masses, while specic human capital does not or is at least less e¤ective in doing
so. This is a natural implication of the essence of general human capital, which is the ability to
transform knowledge into productivity in whatever task at hand; the specic human capital, in
contrast, only increases an individuals productivity in the specic task that he is trained.
5.1 Elite Education
An individual elites objective function is maxfIes;t+1; Ieg;t+1   C(ai; hegti)g where
Ies;t+1  max
mest
rt+1(b
e
t  mest) + ws;t+1h(mest) + ws;t+1 + (0)(1  d(hpg;t+1))Ipt+1;
Ieg;t+1  max
megt
rt+1(b
e
t  megt) + wg;t+1h(megt) + ws;t+1 + (h(megt))(1  d(hpg;t+1))Ipt+1:
12Other models of political transition, either forced or voluntary (see Huang 2008 for more discussions), would not
change the main results on educational change in this paper.
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The two new terms that associate with tax revenues are the only structural di¤erence from a typical
individuals incomes in the benchmark case.
The net benet of having general education over specic education for an elite
 e(kt+1)  Ieg;t+1   Ies;t+1
is higher than that in the benchmark case, since
 e(kt+1) =  (kt+1) +4 t+1;
where 4 t+1  ((h(megt))   (0))(1   d(hpg;t+1))Ipt+1 > 0 is the extra tax revenue obtained by an
elite member with general human capital h(megt). This means that, ceteris peribus, being in the
ruling group makes one more likely to invest in general human capital than in specic skills, and
the more so when the extra tax revenue 4 t+1 is larger.
Let aet+1 denote the threshold ability among the elite to invest in general education. Similar as
(6), it is uniquely determined by
 e(kt+1)  C(aet+1; 0) = 0:
Let the denote the rst time the elite start to invest in general education and tle denote the period
after which all elite members acquire general education; then following similar arguments as in (9)
and (11) of the basic model, the and tle are determined respectively by
 e(kthe)  C(ah; 0) = 0;
 e(ktle)  C(al; 0) = 0:
Proposition 2 The elite education starts earlier and invests more compared with the benchmark
case; when the potential tax revenue is large enough, the elite invest only in general education.
Specically, the < t2 and tle < t3.
In this political economy model, concentration of capital endowment in the few elite and the
extra tax revenue they can extract are two channels for the society to have a higher total bequest,
and hence a larger aggregate stock of physical capital in each period. As a result, if the elite ever
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invest in specic or general human capital, they will do so at a much earlier time and invest more
in it than in the benchmark model. Furthermore, this proposition suggests that when the potential
tax revenue is large enough, the elite may skip the stage of specic education to start directly with
general education, which is in sharp contrast with the benchmark case where specic education
precedes general education. Such a reverse of order in educational change arises because general
education, by increasing ones skills in political rent seeking, brings high returns to individuals over
and above its role in production.13
5.2 Stratied Education under Elite Rule
Consistent with broad historical trends, we assume that, even after period tle, the after-tax income
of workers is still too low for them to have bequest. The elite, however, may nd it benecial for
their own sake to provide free public education, since it increases workersproductivity and hence
the tax revenue. As specic education is less harmful than general education in raising workers
political threat to the elite, it is the natural focus of public education under the elite rule.
Let mpgt and m
p
st denote per student public education investment in general and specic educa-
tion, respectively. The elite choose the optimal general education level mpgt to maximize their joint
pool of tax revenue Tg;t+1 taking into consideration the public education expenditure (N  Ne)mpgt,
where
T g;t+1  max
mpgt
(1  d(h(mpgt)))(Ipt+1   (N  Ne)mpgt):
The optimal specic education level mpst is similarly chosen to get
T s;t+1  max
mpst
(1  d(hpg;t+1))(Ipt+1   (N  Ne)mpst);
taking as given the average general human capital h
p
g;t+1 of the masses, which stays at the basic
level 0 for most times under the elite rule and starts to increase only after period t2e determined
in (13). The optimal choices are summarized in the following proposition.
13The propertied elite, for example, could have taken specic education in order to enhance the management and
values of their properties rather than going through classical studies and assuming positions in the state and church.
The fact that the opposite did happen in history is what this proposition tries to account for.
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Proposition 3 Under the elite rule, free mass education in specic skills starts in some period t1e,
which is determined by
At1ek
1 
t1e+1
= 1=; (12)
and t1e > tle. General education for the masses will never be supported when d0(0)  1 or as long
as hegt  eh, where (Neeh) = d0(0)=(1  d0(0)); and if ever supported, it will never go beyond bh.
This proposition suggests that when the capital-labor ratio kt+1 becomes large enough, investing
in physical capital becomes less protable than investing in public education to increase the human
capital of the masses and thus their productivity. Then the decision on which type of education,
general or specic education, to provide for the masses depends on the trade-o¤ between their
di¤erent e¤ects on increasing the tax base versus reducing the tax rate; the more e¤ective general
education is in lowering the tax rate through 1   d(hpg;t+1) than enlarging the tax base Ipt+1, the
less likely it is to be supported by the elite. In fact, it will never be supported under the elite rule
when d0(0)  1 holds, in which case general education is too powerful in enabling the masses to
resist the elite rule and evade taxes. Though it is possible for the elite to provide general education
for the masses when it is less harmful politically (d0(0) < 1) and when the elite are skillful enough
in political ruling (hegt > eh), the investment of mass general education is capped above because the
elite rule cannot be sustained once the massesaverage general human capital reaches the threshold
level bh.
The following analysis focuses on the case with d0(0)  1 where the elite wont support mass
general education. So from t1e onwards, workers begin to acquire specic human capital through
public education. This enables the income of workers to grow at a faster speed than before, and it
will eventually reach the threshold Z at some period tZ .14 Then from tZ onwards workers start to
have bequest and may choose to invest in general education hpgt by themselves.
The net benet of investing in general education over receiving free specic education is
 p(kt+1)  [1 Ne(hegt+1)(1  d(hpg;t+1))][wg;t+1h(mpgt )  ws;t+1h(mpst )  rt+1mpgt ]
14Note that tZ > t1e is guaranteed when 1= < Z, since ws;t1e+1 = At1ek
1 
t1e+1
= 1= by conditions (3) and (12).
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for a worker, which is smaller than  (kt+1) in the benchmark case not only because of the con-
scatory tax, but also because of the free specic education provided by the elite; both elements
discourage the poors investment in general education and thus help preserve the elite rule.
When the knowledge stock becomes large enough, however, workers with high abilities may
nd it benecial to invest in general education hpgt , instead of receiving the free specic education.
Let t2e denote the rst period when the ablest workers start to acquire general education. Then
following similar arguments as before it is uniquely determined by
 p(kt2e+1)  C(ah; 0) = 0: (13)
The level of general education hpgt among the masses, however, is still lower than that of the elite,
since the masses lack the rent-seeking opportunity to generate tax revenues.
5.3 Mass Education under Democracy: From Dual-Track to General Education
Let tm denote the rst period when the threshold level of workersaverage general human capitalbh is reached; that is, from period tm onwards, d(hpg;t)  1 holds so that the ruling cost becomes
too high for the elite to obtain any tax revenues. This either forces or induces the elite to extend
political power to the masses.15 Without loss of generality, we assume that at period tm democracy
replaces the elite rule so that conscatory tax is abolished.
The education policy under democracy is characterized by (mdgt ;mdst ), where mdgt and mdst
denote each persons contribution to the public investment in general and specic education, re-
spectively. It is determined by majority voting, where each individual votes for the policy that is
closest to his favorite choice of public education investment, which maximizes the future income
of his child. Opting out of public specic education to pursue privately nanced general education
is allowed, in which case an individual still needs to pay his share of the education tax.16 If mass
15The elite may try to control how the masses are educated in order to prevent h
p
g;t from being too high, but their
success is not always guaranteed. The declining cost of print, for example, may have contributed to the failure of
such elite control.
16 If individuals opting out of public specic education do not need to pay their share of the education tax, it
essentially leads to a similar situation as if the education choice is purely left to individuals; in this case their choice
problems become exactly the same as in the benchmark case, where mass education also evolves from dual-track to
general education.
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general education is publicly provided, very few, if any, would choose to opt out of it, and so to
simplify exposition, we assume that opting out of public general education is not allowed by law.
If a child is going to take general education, his future income will be
Idg;t+1  max
mdgt;m
d
st
rt+1(bti  mdst  mdgt) + wg;t+1h(mdgt) + ws;t+1   C(ai; hgti):
The FOC for the interior solution mdgt > 0 is Atkt+1h0(mdgt ) = 1 , the same as (7) in the bench-
mark case. So for all individuals who take general education, mdgt will be identical, independent
of a childs ability and parental bequest or education level. It is straightforward to see that ones
preferred public investment in specic education is zero if his child takes general education.
Similarly, if the child is going to take specic education, his future income will be
Ids;t+1  max
mdgt;m
d
st
rt+1(bti  mdst  mdgt) + ws;t+1h(mdst + ") + ws;t+1;
where " denotes the extra educational investment that arises if some individuals opt out of public
specic education but still pay the educational tax mdst . The FOC for the interior solution mdst > 0
is Atkt+1h0(mdst + ") = 1   , which implies that mdst will be the same for all individuals. And
ones preferred public investment in general education is zero if his child takes specic education.
These results imply that, conditional on the type of education, there is a consensus over the
amount of investment. The conict of interest thus lies in the di¤erent choices of education type
across individuals. If a simple majority of people choose to attend public specic education, then
the dual-track education policy will be the equilibrium choice under majority voting; if the opposite
is true, then general education will instead be publicly nanced.
If free public specic education is provided, every individual has to pay the education tax mdst ,
and those who choose to pursue general education instead need to pay the extra investment mdgt ;
so the net benet of having general education over specic education is
 d(kt+1)  Ids;t+1   Ids;t+1 = wg;t+1h(mdgt )  ws;t+1h(mdst + ")  rt+1mdgt ;
which has to be at least as large as the cost C(ai; hgti) for an individual to choose general education.
Since the benet of general education  d(kt+1) under democracy is larger than  p(kt+1) under
the elite rule, workers whose parents acquired general education under the elite rule will continue
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to do so, and so will workers who are slightly less smart. Let awt denote the ability of the threshold
worker that invests in general education. It is thus uniquely determined by
 d(kt+1) = C(a
w
t ; 0):
It is less clear whether children of the old elite will still acquire general education, since several
forces a¤ect their choices in the opposite directions. On the one hand, the knowledge stock is larger
than before and their parents general education levels are higher than before and than others,
both of which would make them more likely to invest in general education; on the other hand,
the disappearing of the political rent would reduce the benet of having general education. What
happened in history seems to suggest that the old elite children will continue to acquire general
education, which is assumed here. So if specic education is to be publicly supported, individuals
from the old elite families and workers with ai  awt will opt out of public specic education and
pursue privately nanced general education, while the rest with measure (N Ne)F (awt ) will attend
it.17
Let amedian denote the threshold ability level that is determined by
Ne=N + (1  F (amedian))(1 Ne=N) = 1
2
:
When amedian < awt holds, less than half of the population choose to invest in general education,
so free specic education will be provided under majority voting. So the lower amedian is, the more
likely the specic education is publicly provided and the later the free general education policy is
to be adopted. Note that, based on the above identity,
@amedian
@(Ne=N)
=   F (a
median)
 F 0(amedian))(1 Ne=N) > 0;
which implies that a smaller number of old elite leads to a lower amedian and thus delays the arrival
of mass general education under democracy. As the knowledge stock keeps increasing over time,
awt decreases so that more and more workers will choose general education. In a certain period t3m
such that
awt3m  amedian
17This means " = ( N
(N Ne)F (awt )
  1)mdst must hold for a balanced budget for public specic education, and it is
uniquely determined.
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holds for the rst time, the education policy will switch from the dual-track system to free general
education for all. Thus we have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under democracy, the dual-track education system of free specic education plus
private general education is more likely to continue and to last longer when Ne=N is smaller (or
when the initial income inequality is higher); it will eventually be replaced by free general education
for all.
It is useful to note that the existence of dual-track education system in this proposition is not
due to the usual suspect that insiders who receive general education protect their own privileges
by restricting access to general education (Collins 1971, Bertocchi and Spagat 2004). The driving
force is the heterogenous costs among individuals: Those with higher abilities and with parents who
already acquired general education (the old elite belong to this group) have lower costs C(ai; hgti)
than others. When the initial income inequality is high, a large proportion of the population
have high costs of investing in general education and thus prefer to continue with free specic
education. In other words, the dual-track education system under democracy is the rational choice
of the majority, not the conspiracy of the privileged. The majority support for mass general
education, however, will eventually arise when the knowledge stock changes fast enough to warrant
so. That said, one should be aware of the positive externalities of general education over knowledge
accumulation, and hence an earlier adoption of mass general education than mandated by majority
voting can be welfare improving.
5.4 Summary
The timing of educational change in this political economy model is illustrated in Figure 2. The elite
start to invest in general education after the, before which all savings are invested in physical capital
accumulation. As the aggregate stock of general human capital, though so far composed completely
by that of the elite, keeps increasing, the knowledge stock expands at ever faster speeds than before,
and it eventually induces the elite for their own interests to support public specic education for
workers starting from t1e. Though the elite may never want to support general education for the
masses, the ablest workers invest in general education themselves from period t2e onwards. When
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Figure 2: Educational Change in the Political Economy Model: From Elite to Mass General Edu-
cation
the average general human capital of workers reaches the threshold level bh in period tm, the elite
rule becomes too costly to maintain and is thus replaced by democracy, under which there is no
expropriating tax and public education is chosen by majority voting. The dual-track education
system includes public specic education for majority and private general education for the rest,
which will nally give way to public general education for all after period t3m.
The existence of political rent-seeking opportunities facilitates investment in general human
capital for the elite and encourages public education in specic skills for workers; it thus may
increase productivity in general, especially when the distortion caused by such rent-seeking activities
is relatively minor. In the later stage of development, however, it tends to prolong specic education
and delay investment in general human capital for the masses. More importantly, this political
economy model accounts for the sharp contrasts between the elite education and mass education in
terms of timing and content: elite education starts much earlier and focuses on general education,
while mass education starts much later and initially focuses on specic education; though mass
specic education is compatible with and thus can be well supported by the elite rule, mass general
education is much less so, and hence most likely to occur under democracy.
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6 Extensions and Discussions
Humanities versus Natural Sciences. In the model, the contents of general education are
assumed homogenous in terms of their contributions to productivity and rent-seeking e¤ectiveness.
They are not necessarily so. For example, humanities seem to be more e¤ective in increasing
ones rent-seeking skills than natural sciences, while the opposite tends to be true for improving
production productivity in general (Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny 1991).
The model can be readily extended to accommodate such heterogeneity in general education.
For example, the production function can be adjusted by replacing Hg;t+1 with 1HRg;t+1+2H
N
g;t+1,
where HRg;t+1 denotes the aggregate human capital in humanities, H
N
g;t+1 denotes the aggregate
human capital in natural sciences, and 1  2; the rent-seeking skill (hg;t+1) can be changed to
(3h
R
g;t+1 + 4h
N
g;t+1), where 3  4; and nally an individual can invest simultaneously in these
two types of general human capital.
Following similar arguments as in the model, it is easy to get the following results. In the basic
model without rent-seeking opportunities, individuals will invest more in natural sciences than in
humanities, which is also true under democracy in the political economy model. Under the elite
rule, in contrast, the elite will invest more in humanities than in natural sciences, the more so if
the gains from rent-seeking are larger. And everything else equal, societies with relatively more
gains from rent-seeking than others would invest more in humanities but less in natural sciences.
It would be interesting to test these results empirically in future research.
Closed-Elite versus Open-Elite. The political economy model adopted in this paper is a
model of closed-elite in that the elite group is xed and determined by birth, and as a result only a
xed group in society is entitled to gains from rent-seeking. An alternative is an open-elite model,
such as the bureaucratic system in feudal China, where the elite were recruited through standard
exams that were open to all members in society (Collins 2000). In such a model, the access to
rent-seeking gains is endogenous, since anyone can choose to invest in general education to become
the elite, if the benet of doing so outweighs the cost.
From a naive point of view, the open-elite model seems to be better since it gives everyone a more
equal chance to join the elite than the closed-elite model. A quite surprising result emerging from
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our analysis shows that the opposite is true, however, at least from the whole societys perspective.
Following similar arguments in the model, one can nd that the open-elite system is more e¤ective
in stabilizing the elite rule in comparison to the closed-elite system, since the richest and smartest
individuals will invest in general education and join the elite, which implies that the repressed
masses get either no education at all or only specic education and thus have much limited ability
to achieve political power and overthrow the elite rule. Furthermore, societies with the open-elite
system tend to over-invest in humanities and under-invest in natural sciences than those with the
closed-elite system. Both results seem consistent with the contrasting di¤erences between feudal
China and western Europe.
Educational Di¤erences Across Countries. An implication of the model is that general
education of the masses starts earlier and thus its knowledge stock grows faster in society with
a more diverse talent pool. This may speak to the educational di¤erences between the U.S. and
Europe where vocational education is emphasized more in Europe than in the U.S. (Goldin 2001,
Krueger and Kumar 2004b). A possible reason could be that the U.S. as an immigrant country
has a relative more diverse distribution of talent and hence started mass general education earlier.
Specically, suppose that talent ai is distributed on [aUl ; a
U
h ] in society U and on [a
E
l ; a
E
h ] in society
E, where aUl < a
E
l , a
U
h > a
E
h , and the median is kept the same. So abilities are more diversely
distributed in society U than in society E. Since C1 < 0 and aUh > a
E
h , it follows from (13) that
tU2e < t
E
2e must hold, which means that general education of the masses starts earlier in society U
than in society E; and this in turn leads to earlier democratization (tUm < t
E
m) and earlier beginning
of mass general education (tU3m < t
E
3m).
Discussions on Modeling Choices. As briey mentioned in the Introduction, the model
focuses on the changing level and content of organized learning conducted in schools. This is by
no means intended to deny the ubiquitous presence of informal learning in daily life, which long
preceded any form of organized learning in history and has always been playing an important
role in knowledge accumulation. In fact, its existence is acknowledged in the assumption that
each individual is endowed with a basic unit of specic human capital even without organized
education, and its indispensable role is also reected in the assumption (0) > 0, which means
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that the knowledge stock still grows, though slowly, even when there is no organized education.
Furthermore, investment in organized education becomes worthwhile in the model only after the
knowledge stock accumulated by such informal learning becomes large enough.
This paper does not explicitly model why learning becomes organized in schools at some point for
a couple of reasons. First, the exact organization of learning presumably involves di¤erent economic
forces than those considered in the model, and thus its analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, considering it explicitly is not likely to change the main results of this paper. One may
argue, for example, that if the economy of scale is more easily reached in general education than
vocational education, this may explain why organized education began from universities among
the elite.18 This argument by itself, however, does not explain why, on the contrary, vocational
education preceded general education for the masses. A plausible explanation is readily provided
by the same political economy model as before: Even though it is best in this scenario to provide
general education for the masses from pure economic considerations, the elite may choose the
opposite because of the political concerns that general education makes the masses more di¢ cult to
rule. This suggests that the political economy model captures some fundamental forces underlying
the di¤erent paths taken by elite and mass education, which are the main focus of this paper.
7 Concluding Remarks
For many years in history only the few ruling elite were educated and the elite education focused
on general education rather than technical or specic skills, while the masses started to receive
education in the nineteenth century in western Europe together with industrialization; and the
mass education was initially focusing on specic vocational skills and then gradually moving to
general education. Such educational change in terms of who are educated and what they learn is
accounted for in this paper in a framework of long run economic and political development.
The main results of this paper suggest that the educational change can be categorized into
three phases, namely, the elite education phase where only the elite are educated and it focuses
on general education, the stratied education phase that includes both general education for the
18This may also be achieved by assuming large enough (0); see Proposition 1.
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elite as before and specic education for the masses, and nally, the mass education phase under
democracy, which continues with the dual-track education system including general education for
some and specic education for majority, and eventually converges to providing general education
for all. These results are broadly consistent with the historical evidence.
More interestingly, the paper nds that, though mass specic education may be supported
under the elite rule, this is very unlikely for mass general education, which occurs typically under
democracy. In other words, the elite rule is often associated with a lack of general education for the
masses. This is probably driven by an important di¤erence between general and specic education,
where general education is more likely to increase an individuals skills in whatever tasks at hand,
which by denition include skills of extracting gains and defending ones own interests in political
conicts. The same insights suggest that if humanities and social sciences are more e¤ective in
improving ones rent-seeking skills than natural sciences, the elite will invest more in the former
than in the latter, the more so in societies where the gains from rent-seeking are larger. As shown
in the paper, the model can also be readily extended in other ways to yield intriguing results that
may account for cross-country di¤erences in education and its e¤ects on economic and political
development.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Note that the incomes Ig;t+1 and Is;t+1 arise from a common function It+1  rt+1(bt  
mt ) +wt+1h(mt ) +ws;t+1 where wt+1 can take two distinct values, either ws;t+1 or wg;t+1. By the
Envelope Theorem we know @It+1=@wt+1 = h(mt ) > 0 if mt > 0, that is, the income It+1 strictly
increases in wage rate wt+1; but then wg;t+1 > ws;t+1 implies Ig;t+1 > Is;t+1, which is equivalent to
 (kt+1) > 0.
Observe that
 0(kt+1) =
@Ig;t+1
@kt+1
  @I

s;t+1
@kt+1
= w0g;t+1h(m

gt)   w0s;t+1h(mst)  r0t+1(mgt  mst)
= (1  )k t+1[At+1h(mgt)  Ath(mst)] + (1  )k  1t+1 (mgt  mst);
where the second equality follows from the Envelop Theorem. Since At+1  At and h0  0,
 0(kt+1) > 0 holds if mgt  mst, which is indeed true.
Now we prove that mgt > mst holds; that is, when an individual is considering the optimal
investment in these two types of human capital, he would invest more resources in acquiring general
education than in specic education. For an individual that invests in hs;t+1, his objective function
is
max
mst
rt+1(bt  mst) + ws;t+1h(mst) + ws;t+1:
The FOC after plugging in (2) and (3) becomes
Atkt+1h
0(mst) =
1  

for mst > 0; (14)
Atkt+1  1  

for mst = 0: (15)
So the threshold level for Atkt+1 is 1  , below which no resources are spent in accumulating specic
human capital. The optimal amount of specic education mst is a function of At and kt+1 obtained
from (14).
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For an individual that invests in hg;t+1, his objective function is
max
mgt
rt+1(bt  mgt) + wg;t+1h(mgt) + ws;t+1   C(ai; hgti):
The FOC is
At+1kt+1h
0(mgt) =
1  

for mgt > 0; (16)
At+1kt+1  1  

for mgt = 0:
For interior solutions, the optimal amount of general education mgt is a function of At+1 and
kt+1, while it is independent of ai. This implies that h(mgt) is the same for all who invest in
it, regardless of their individual abilities. Note that mgt > mst > 0 because h00() < 0 and
h0(mgt) = 1 At+1kt+1 <
1 
Atkt+1
= h0(mst) holds for interior solutions. Since At+1 > At; the
threshold condition At+1kt+1 = 1  for general education investment must hold at some time
earlier than that for specic education. This means mgt  mst is always true.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. The investment cost C(ai; hgti) is strictly decreasing in ai as C1 < 0; C2 < 0 and
hgti = h(m

g;t 1) does not depend on individual ai, which is shown in the above proof. As  (kt+1)
is independent of ai while C(ai; hgti) strictly decreases in ai, a threshold ability at+1 must exist
so that the marginal person with ability at+1 is indi¤erent between investing in either general or
specic human capital. Note that when it is the rst time that an individual reaches the threshold
of starting to invest in general human capital, his parent must have not invested in it so that
h(mg;t 1) = 0. The reason is straightforward. If h(mg;t 1) > 0, then  (kt)   C(at+1; 0)  0 must
hold for the parent, which together with kt+1 > kt then implies  (kt+1) C(at+1; 0) > 0 is true for
the child. But this contradicts with (6). Based on (6) we have
@at+1
@kt+1
=
 0(kt+1)
C1(at+1; h(mg;t 1))
< 0;
since C1 < 0. Similarly we can show that @at+1=@At+1 < 0 and @at+1=@At < 0. So at+1 strictly
decreases over time and in capital-labor ratio kt+1.
Proof of Proposition 1.
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Proof. The equality in (15) is achieved in period t1, from then on people start to invest in
specic human capital. When  (kt1)   C(ah; 0) < 0, no one invests in general education before
period t1, which means t1 < t2 will hold. As  (kt1) strictly increases in (0) and is equal to zero
when (0) = 0, there must exist a unique level of (0), denoted by eg, such that  (kt1 ; eg) = C(ah; 0).
So a su¢ cient condition for  (kt1)  C(ah; 0) < 0 is (0) < eg.
Since there is no human capital investment before period t1, we get Hgt = 0, Hst = N , and
At = At 1(1 + (0)) in any period t  t1; then At+1kt+1 = Kt+1(1 + (0))=N by denition. So
(10) can be rewritten as Kt1 =
1 

N
1+(0) . Thus K1 < Kt1 is su¢ cient to insure that t1 > 0,
where K1 = (A 1K
1 
0   NZ). This condition is equivalent to (0) < bg where bg is determined
by bg = (1 )NK1   1. So any (0)  minfeg; bgg) is su¢ cient to establish the timing 0 < t1 < t2.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. For an individual elite that invests in general human capital heg;t+1, his objective function
is
max
megt
rt+1(b
e
t  megt) + wg;t+1h(megt) + ws;t+1 + (h(megt))(1  d(hpg;t+1))Ipt+1   C(ai; hegti):
The FOC is
[At+1kt+1 + k

t+1I
p
t+1
0(h(megt))(1  d(hpg;t+1))=]h0(megt) =
1  

for megt > 0; (17)
At+1kt+1 + k

t+1I
p
t+1
0(0)= <
1  

for megt = 0:
For interior solutions, the optimal general education for an elite megt is higher than that in the
benchmark case mgt, since a higher general human capital enables him to get a larger tax revenue
as reected by kt+1I
p
t+1
0(h(megt))(1   d(hpg;t+1))= in the FOC. And the di¤erence is larger when
the tax base Ipt+1 is larger. The investment in general education among the elite will start earlier
than in the benchmark case due to the positive term kt+1I
p
t+1
0(0)=, where 1 d(hpg;t+1) = 1 must
hold due to h
p
g;t+1 = 0, since the education of the poor masses cannot start before the rich elite.
As in the benchmark case, the threshold ability aet+1 strictly decreases over time and in capital-
labor ratio kt+1 as long as h
p
g;t+1 = 0, which is true well after tle as conrmed in the next proposition.
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Observe that
 e0(kt+1) =  0(kt+1) +
@4 t+1
@kt+1
> 0;
where @4 t+1=@kt+1 = @((h(megt ))   (0))Ipt+1=@kt+1 > 0 due to @megt=@kt+1 > 0, which can
be obtained by the Implicit Function Theorem from equation (17). Note that aet+1 < at+1 holds
because  e(kt+1) >  (kt+1) is true due to the extra positive term 4 t+1. Given that aet+1 < at+1
and both decrease over time, we get immediately the < t2 and tle < t3.
If one invests in specic human capital, the FOC is the same as (14) and (15) so that mest
has the same functional form as mst in the benchmark case. However, their optimal levels at each
period are di¤erent. Concentration of capital endowment in the few hands of the elite and the extra
tax revenue allow the society to have a higher total bequest, and hence a larger aggregate stock of
physical capital in each period. So if the elite ever invest in specic human capital, they do so at a
much earlier time and invest more in it, that is, tse < t1 and mest > mst, where tse is the rst time
the elite start to invest in specic education such that Atse 1ktse =
1 
 .
When the tax revenue is large enough, the elite will invest only in general education and never
in specic skills. This is true when all elite individuals have invested in general education by period
tse, that is, when tle  tse or equivalently  e(ktse) > C(al; 0) holds, which is true when the extra
tax revenue 4 tse is large enough. Since 4 tes strictly decreases in Ne=N , the ratio of the elite
versus the masses, there exists a unique level bn such that 4 tse(bn) = C(al; 0). This implies that
Ne=N  bn is a su¢ cient condition for  e(ktse) > C(al; 0).
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The optimal specic education level mpst is chosen to get
T s;t+1  (1  d(hpg;t+1))(Ipt+1   (N  Ne)mpst )
= (N  Ne)(1  d(hpg;t+1))max
mpst
(ws;t+1h(m
p
st) mpst):
The FOC for the specic education level mpst is
h0(mpst)Atk
1 
t+1 = 1 for m
p
st > 0;
Atk
1 
t+1 < 1 for m
p
st = 0; (18)
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The LHS of (18) is increasing over time, so there must exist some period t1e such that the equality
holds. Since Atsektse+1 =
1 
 , we know that Atsektse+1 = (1   ) < 1, which means t1e > tse.
This, combined with tse > tle, indeed conrms our assumption that t1e > tle.
The optimal general education level mpst is chosen to get
T g;t+1  (1  d(h(mpgt )))(Ipt+1   (N  Ne)mpgt )
= (N  Ne)max
mpgt
(1  d(h(mpgt)))(wg;t+1h(mpgt) mpgt):
The FOC for the general education level mpgt is
At+1k
1 
t+1 [1  d(h)  d0(h))h]h0 + d(h)  d0(h)h0mpgt = 1 for mpgt > 0;
At+1k
1 
t+1 (1  d0(0)) < 1 for mpgt = 0: (19)
where h is the shorthand for h(mpgt ). If d0(0)  1, then (19) will always hold, which means the
ruling elite will never support mass general education. If d0(0) < 1, the LHS of (19) is smaller than
that in (18) if
(Neh
e
gt ) <
d0(0)
1  d0(0) (20)
given that At+1 = At(1 + (Nehegt )). The LHS of (20) is strictly increasing in hegt , which implies
that there exists a unique threshold eh such that (20) holds with equality. In other words, before
their general education reaches eh, the ruling elite will only support mass education in specic skills.
Even after hegt > eh is achieved, the elite may still choose not to support mass general education if
T g;t+1 < T s;t+1. Specically, the investment in mass general education, if any, will never go beyondbh under the elite rule, otherwise the tax revenue will become zero or negative.
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